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Background: Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has become an integral element of how the alcohol industry
promotes itself. The existing analyses of CSR in the alcohol industry point to the misleading nature of these CSR
practices. Yet, research has been relatively sparse on how the alcohol industry advances CSR in an attempt to
facilitate underlying business interests, and in what ways the ongoing display of industry CSR impacts public health.
This paper aims to investigate the alcohol industry’s recent CSR engagements and explain how CSR forms part of
the industry’s wider political and corporate strategies.
Methods: Our study used qualitative methods to collect and analyse data. We searched for materials pertaining to
CSR activities from websites of three transnational alcohol corporations, social media platforms, media reports and
other sources. Relevant documents were thematically analysed with an iterative approach.
Results: Our analysis identified three CSR tactics employed by the alcohol companies which are closely tied in with
the industry’s underlying corporate intents. First, the alcohol manufacturers employ CSR as a means to frame issues,
define problems and guide policy debates. In doing this, the alcohol companies are able to deflect and shift the
blame from those who manufacture and promote alcoholic products to those who consume them. Second, the
alcohol corporations promote CSR initiatives on voluntary regulation in order to delay and offset alcohol control
legislation. Third, the alcohol corporations undertake philanthropic sponsorships as a means of indirect brand
marketing as well as gaining preferential access to emerging alcohol markets.
Conclusions: The increasing penetration and involvement of the alcohol industry into CSR highlights the urgent
needs for public health counter actions. Implementation of any alcohol control measures should include banning
or restricting the publicity efforts of the industry’s CSR and informing the public of the alcohol industry’s notion of
social responsibility. More significantly, an internationally binding instrument should be called for to enable
countries to differentiate between genuine concerns and spurious altruism, and in doing so, resist the industry’s
attempt to erode alcohol control.
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Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has become an inte-
gral element of the alcohol industry’s self-representation
and image. With renewed public awareness of the serious
harm caused by alcohol consumption and the prospect of
adverse implications on profits, a growing number of alco-
hol corporations are competing with each other to adopt
CSR strategies in an attempt to portray themselves as
good corporate citizens. Major transnational alcohol* Correspondence: swyoon@hku.hk
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reproduction in any medium, provided the ormanufactures have websites dedicated to CSR which dis-
play various CSR related programmes and/or campaigns.
These invariably include or involve some sort of sponsor-
ship schemes, public awareness talks or dialogues, educa-
tion programmes, networking events, and partnerships
with government as well as voluntary codes of practice for
marketing and advertising. They openly profile themselves
as socially responsible actors who are willing to embrace
societal concerns on alcohol-related harm.
In its original sense, the term CSR is defined as a moral
and stakeholder obligation [1], emanating from a notion
that business is responsible to society in general and thusal Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
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or indirectly affect or are affected by a firm’s activity [2].
Whereas the overall value of the alcohol industry’s CSR re-
mains questionable, public health advocates note the fun-
damental contradictions between the alcohol industry’s
claims of responsibility and their continuing promotion of
alcoholic products.
For instance, Hill views the alcohol industry’s CSR as a
public relations strategy which may serve to promote the
global marketing of alcohol rather than addressing the
health impact and risks inherent in alcoholic products [3].
Similarly, Casswell [4] and others [5-7] contend that the
primary role of industry-supported social aspect organiza-
tions is not to enhance public health but to influence deci-
sion makers and government policy while promoting
ineffective interventions. The alcohol industry’s conflict of
interest is so marked that today a growing body of litera-
ture takes the view that the alcohol industry takes advan-
tage of CSR rhetoric in an attempt to achieve corporate
interests [8-11]. Such literature also suggests that the alco-
hol industry’s CSR engagement is not only a mechanism
for the preservation of corporate interests but a platform
through which members of the industry seek to invalidate
a broader public health perspective on problems associated
with alcohol consumption and influence the public and
policy makers [12]. The alcohol industry’s CSR activities
are, in the words of Peter Anderson, “a communication de-
vice to delay policy – and, they work [13].”
Despite an abundance of widely available literature
pointing to the existence of inconsistencies between the al-
cohol industry’s CSR claims and how they conduct their
business in practice, there is a general paucity of critical
examination of the alcohol industry’s CSR activities.
Existing analyses of CSR initiatives tend to focus on the
likelihood of discrepancy between the rhetoric and actual
practices of alcohol corporations. Yet, when studies shift
their focus to expose the industry’s hidden agendas behind
their CSR activities, such studies are inclined to “acknow-
ledge” the industry’s motivations to develop CSR initiatives
rather than investigating the details of how the industry
employed CSR to advance their interest in practice [14,15]
Furthermore, whilst much of the literature on the alcohol
industry recognises that CSR functions as part of the
industry’s public relations strategy, relatively little has been
done to critically examine the political nature of the alco-
hol industry’s CSR activities [16,17].
Drawing on an analysis of the global alcohol industry’s
documents and other relevant materials, this paper aims
to investigate the alcohol industry’s recent CSR engage-
ments and explain how CSR forms part of the industry’s
wider political and corporate strategies. This paper par-
ticularly focuses on examining precisely what the alcohol
industry aspires to gain from CSR, how they advance
their CSR in an attempt to facilitate this underlyingintent, and to what extent the ongoing display of industry
CSR poses a potentially significant challenge to public
health and effective alcohol control. Our analysis addresses
the nature and impact of the alcohol industry’s intensifying
CSR activities on a global scale to highlight the need for
collective global action and regulatory framework to safe-
guard public health in response to the behaviour and prac-
tices of transnational alcohol corporations.
Methods
Our study used qualitative methods to collect and analyse
data. We searched for materials from three major alcohol
manufacturers in the market: Pernod Ricard, SABMiller,
and Anheuser-Busch InBev (AB InBev). These alcohol
manufacturers were selected on the basis of their market
dominance in the global sale of alcoholic beverages [18,19].
In addition to alcohol companies, the International Centre
for Alcohol Policies (ICAP), one of the alcohol industry’s
social aspect organizations, was included in our data col-
lection since such organizations represent the industry’s
CSR views and perspectives.
Data search began with the websites of the three alcohol
manufacturers and ICAP since the alcohol industry tactic-
ally utilizes company websites to exercise public relations
and publicize their activities. Key terms such as “corporate
social responsibility,” “responsible drinking,” “ethics,” “sus-
tainable development,” “philanthropy,” “corporate citizen-
ship,” and “corporate code of conduct” were used and
relevant terms were identified by the snowball technique.
This yielded commentaries, policy statements, speeches,
annual reports, press releases, newsletters, interviews, an-
nual summaries of CSR activities, presentations, and tran-
scripts of meetings. Although searches were not confined
to a specific time frame, materials dated between 2008 and
2012 provided most of the information.
Additional materials such as online pamphlets and out-
lines of event planning were obtained through email corres-
pondence with the APCO Worldwide, a public relations
agency for the alcohol industry that contacted us to solicit
participation (which we declined) in one of the alcohol man-
ufacturer’s local public event on responsible drinking.
Facebook pages and Youtube channels for the alcohol com-
panies listed above were accessed to identify CSR messages
placed on these two social media platforms. We also
searched LexisNexis, Newsbank and internet search engines
using the same search terms between December 2011 and
January 2013 for relevant coverage and contextualization.
A total of 368 industry materials and 578 media reports
were collected. The materials were screened to include
only those that primarily concerned industry tactics and ar-
guments on CSR. Therefore materials pertaining to the in-
stitutional actions, programmes and campaigns, and
strategic plans aimed at publicizing CSR engagements were
included for analysis. We excluded materials according to
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languages other than English; (2) materials that focus on
corporate activities but considered unrelated to the CSR
(e.g. market trends, product sales, management struc-
ture); (3) materials where CSR claims and preferences of a
particular corporate entity are not articulated; and (4) du-
plicates (e.g. draft and final forms, PDF and interactive ver-
sions). These criteria were met by 281 documents.
These materials were imported into NVivo 10 and a
thematic analysis based upon grounded theory was
conducted [20]. In the present study, coding categories
were developed progressing from open coding to analyt-
ical coding in a cyclical process to ensure that analysis
involved continual interaction with the data. Special ef-
forts were made to ensure that the coding represents
consensus in how the alcohol industry characterized
CSR initiatives. While each item was coded by the lead
author, the second author took part in the data coding
process to provide an indication of the accuracy of
theme generation and allocation. This involved the cod-
ing of a proportion of the materials to enable the coding
frame to be clarified and modified. Results of the coding
frame were shared and areas of discrepancy were
discussed to ensure that the findings reflect an accurate
interpretation of the industry rhetoric and practice.Results
CSR as an instrument for framing alcohol-related
problems: personal responsibility
The three alcohol corporations appeared to have devoted
considerable resources to the framing of issues on alcohol
consumption as part of their CSR initiatives. Some com-
panies set up front groups or use PR companies alongside
a number of other communications platforms to dissemin-
ate and propagate their commitments to what is called “re-
sponsible drinking”. For instance, in early 2012, Pernod
Ricard chose APCO Worldwide to develop the implemen-
tation plan for the project on responsible drinking habits
[21]. APCO Worldwide is a public relations company that
“helps clients anticipate what's next and smartly manage
reputational, communication and business opportunities
and challenges that affect their organizations, products,
services or brands [22].” It is well known that APCO
Worldwide has worked for companies in the tobacco in-
dustry, including British American Tobacco, Philip Morris
and Brown and Williamson on issues related to the
industry’s sponsorship of CSR [23]. On 17 January 2012, on
behalf of Pernod Ricard Asia, APCO Worldwide drafted a
proposal on the implementation of public events on “Alco-
hol & Youth” with an effort to significantly “raise aware-
ness on CSR and responsible drinking” and to heighten
“external visibility [24].” Likewise, SABMiller created a
dedicated website called Talking Alcohol [25] in closecollaboration with Drinkware Trust [26], a UK-based social
aspect organization sponsored by the industry. The site
provides views on alcohol in general as well as information
about alcohol consumption.
At the centre of the responsible drinking initiative is the
promotion of a core idea built on the alcohol industry’s cor-
porate interest: the value of personal responsibility [27]. It
is important to note that the nature and causes of alcohol-
related problems can be framed in widely different ways
which can subsequently inform different response mea-
sures. In other words, a problem framed as a matter of per-
sonal responsibility can be addressed differently from one
that is dues to other factors such as corporate misconduct
or a social environment in which alcohol is consumed. Al-
cohol companies promote the view that alcohol confers
benefits and pleasures, and that it should be thought of pri-
marily as an aid to recreation and possibly as beneficial to
health. For example, SABMiller’s CSR website states that
“our beer adds to the enjoyment of life for the overwhelm-
ing majority of consumers….alcohol may provide physical
benefits for some people when consumed in moderation
[28].” [emphasis added] It typically follows an assertion that
alcohol manufacturers simply provide choices and pleasure,
and do not promote the abuse of their product. The idea
underpinning this argument is that reckless drinking of in-
dividual consumers is the root cause of alcohol-related
problems. SABMiller’s CSR website suggests that:
Drinking alcohol is a matter of individual judgment
and accountability. It’s been a part of social life and
celebrations around the world for thousands of years.
Drinking sensibly means you can enjoy yourself – and
stay safe [29]. [emphasis added]
Accordingly, the alcohol industry’s CSR rhetoric con-
veys the idea that maintaining a sense of individual
responsibility is the key to preventing alcohol-related
harms and therefore excessive or inappropriate con-
sumption among certain individuals are to be blamed
and controlled. For example, in its CSR document,
Pernod Ricard states that:
Alcohol is enjoyed by many people around the world
because of its relaxing properties, as an enhancer of
sociability and as a complement to meals. Alcohol can
also create problems for individuals who drink it
irresponsibly and in excess [30]. [emphasis added]
Alcohol companies in general acknowledge the so-
cial harms associated with alcohol consumption such
as crime, violence, homicide and drunk driving. But
nevertheless, the industry’s rhetoric deliberately avoids
attention to corporate sources of alcohol problems by
targeting individual drinkers as deviant for harming
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position statements that:
We acknowledge that while alcohol does not cause
violence, some people who commit acts of violence
might have also consumed alcohol. The relationship
between alcohol consumption and violent behaviour is
however extremely complex ….those who choose to
drink too much, to be violent, or both must be held
fully accountable for their choices and actions [31].
[emphasis added]
Note that the rhetoric on the private moral choices of
drinkers and individual responsibility enables alcohol
corporations to be selective about which areas of alco-
hol policies are to be adopted or eliminated. First of all,
alcohol companies do not support the kind of across-
the-board regulation, particularly those that seek to
control overall alcohol consumption levels because
such measures pose a serious threat to the industry’s
profits. Instead, the industry employs a dissecting narra-
tive which cuts across and targets different segments
of the population. Alcohol companies contend that
population-based measures alone are inadequate in
tackling alcohol-related problems. On its CSR website,
ICAP asserts that:
It [alcohol industry’s CSR] begins with the recognition that
one-size-fits-all solutions are generally not effective.
We [ICAP] have consistently seen evidence that such
approaches are unrealistic and that the initiatives
most effective in preventing and reducing alcohol-
related harms are those tailored to regional and
local societies and cultures [32]. [emphasis added]
SABMiller shares the view that “Different things work
in different markets. So our efforts [on alcohol responsi-
bility] are locally designed and run with help from local
partners [33].” In essence, the industry narratives indi-
cate that they do not support any measures that curb
overall demand (and presumed consumption) through
restrictions.
Second, since the alcohol industry claimed that prob-
lems are usually caused by misusers, namely a “higher
risk group”, one should educate consumers on drinking
responsibly. Alcohol companies are a strong proponent
of alcohol education and campaigns which are por-
trayed as the most effective way of tackling alcohol-
related harm. All three companies in this study have
actively engaged in a variety of education programmes
as part of their CSR strategies. For instance, AB InBev
claims to have invested more than USD $300 million in
awareness and education programmes for responsible
drinking [34]. Pernod Ricard announced that they havefinanced more than 50 projects on responsible drinking
awareness as stated on its CSR website [35]. Likewise,
SABMiller claims to have invested USD $875 million to-
ward the promotion of responsible drinking prog-
rammes [36]. SABMiller stated that:
Our efforts will continue to focus on education and
awareness initiatives, especially in developing
countries, with a particular emphasis on at-risk young
people and those affected by the harmful drinking of
others, as emphasized by the WHO strategy [37].
[emphasis added]
The alcohol companies’ CSR initiatives on the educa-
tion of problem drinkers and young drinkers do not rep-
resent the whole story of the industry’s CSR tactics.
More recent CSR initiatives show that the industry has
attempted to highlight the role of parents as an agent
responsible for young people’s drinking practices and
access to alcohol. For example, Pernod Ricard launched
parent education and awareness campaigns as part
of the company’s underage drinking prevention prog-
ramme. It claims that “Latest studies helped to shed light
on the formative influence of parental attitude on the
drinking habits of minors. The more a child feels permit-
ted to drink, the more he or she risks developing an al-
cohol dependency [38].” The emphasis on parents in
alcohol education of children tends to be consistent
across alcohol companies. SABMiller implemented the
Family Talk About Drinking programme aiming to en-
courage communication between parents and children
[39]. While strong parental ties may be crucial to en-
couraging children to make appropriate decisions about
alcohol, there is a risk that such an emphasis can funda-
mentally shift the focus of responsibility from the
industry’s corporate practice in aggressive alcohol mar-
keting and promotion to parents (or adults) who raise
young children.
The alcohol companies’ documents also illustrate that
the alcohol industry’s CSR on education and public aware-
ness tends to shift the provision of educational information
from traditional school-based education and public cam-
paigns to web-based sources and other communication
channels such as mobile devices and social media with un-
precedented sophistication, an approach regarded by pub-
lic health experts as a powerful marketing tool for the
industry to target youth and promote alcohol brands [40].
For example, AB InBev created the Family Talk About
Drinking Program on Facebook with 54,921 people liking
the page as of December 2012 [41]. SABMiller posted a
wide range of video clips on responsible drinking and other
related CSR activities on YouTube [42]. Likewise, Pernod
Ricard launched a Facebook platform entitled Here’s to
Tomorrow: Accept Responsibility which was designed to
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[43]. While the policy implications of such activities re-
quire further scrutiny, alcohol companies’ CSR tactics have
been thriving in framing how personal responsibility asso-
ciated with alcohol consumption should be understood
and communicated.
CSR as a form of preemptive corporate defense:
voluntary regulation
In reviewing the alcohol corporations’ websites and docu-
ments, one of the dominant points of their CSR rhetoric is
premised on the idea of “voluntarism”. We have observed
that the alcohol companies support self-regulation and vol-
untary market initiatives, which are considered by the public
health community as corporate tactics which the alcohol in-
dustry uses to preemptively protect business from future
regulatory restrictions on their marketing and advertising
freedom [44]. The alcohol companies’ promotion of the vol-
untarist narrative is based on the assumption that the mar-
ket will effectively resolve many pressing issues surrounding
alcohol consumption and proposed solutions should then
fit within market mechanisms. Focusing on self-disciplined
regulation gives alcohol companies leeway to circumvent
and counter unwanted government intrusion into their
business profits. As the ICAP’s CSR website comments:
Government laws and regulations and industry self-
regulation can complement each other; some form of
co-regulation is becoming the norm around the world.
This combination retains an overarching government
authority but helps avoid the unintended
consequences of severe restrictions on marketing
[45]. [emphasis added]
Similarly, AB InBev stated on its website that its in-
ternal code seeks to avoid regulatory repercussions: “By
adhering fully to this [voluntary] code, we protect our
business from future regulatory restrictions to our
current marketing and advertising freedom [46].” The
argument that government regulation would hamper
voluntary efforts of alcohol corporations to improve
their behaviour is illogical but has been presented to fur-
ther reinforce the ground for corporate voluntarism.
ICAP insists that “self-regulation is a flexible instrument,
but it can only truly flourish where the legislative frame-
work gives it sufficient scope to do so [47].”
In their bid to oppose any legally binding measures, the
three alcohol companies have launched high profile events
on self-regulation. One of such efforts was to publicize the
training of industry employees and other stakeholders in
the alcohol-related industries as proxies. For example, in
May 2011, Pernod Ricard launched a Responsib’ALL Day
programme by rallying the company’s staff members across
the regions [48]. In its 2011 annual report, it stated thatOur employees are front-line ambassadors. In order
to encourage appropriation of this new platform
[Responsib’ALL Day programme] and especially its
adaptation to local contexts, we decided to involve
them through a cascading training programme. By
May 2011, more than 15,000 employees have been
trained in CSR [49]. [emphasis added]
Similarly since 2010, AB InBev launched Global Be(er) Re-
sponsible Day to encourage its employees to talk to retailers
and consumers about responsible drinking [50]. It states
that “we support programs that help educate bar and wait
staff on how to serve and sell responsibly [51].” In its 2012
press release, the company claimed that it aims to train a
total of 1 million people who serve and sell alcohol by the
end of 2014 [52]. SABMiller stated on its website that more
than 50,000 employees had participated in training about al-
cohol responsibility and the company’s policies as part of
the company’s responsible drinking campaign [53].
The alcohol industry’s voluntarist narrative has also
yielded publications of a series of “code of conduct” docu-
ments for marketing and advertisements. Voluntary codes
of conduct are in-house policies directed to employees in
the form of broad statements or more specific but fairly
minimal rules, which usually include statements of support
for national industry codes of alcohol advertising stan-
dards, establishment of internal marketing review commit-
tees and systems of self-regulation. Our data shows that
guidelines are remarkably similar across different alcohol
corporations. For example, SABMiller published Respon-
sible Drinking Messages in Packaging and Advertising in
April 2012 [54]. Pernod Ricard also issued the Pernod Ri-
card Code of Commercial Communications in June 2012
[55]. Likewise, AB InBev published the Anheuser-Busch
InBev Code of Business Conduct in August 2011 [56].
All these documents have one commonality: they stress
that their advertisements are not targeted at young people
below the legal drinking age and that they do not encour-
age excessive or irresponsible drinking. In contrast to the
widely accepted view among public health advocates, the
industry has underplayed the impact of alcohol marketing
on youths’ decisions to drink: “To our knowledge, studies
indicate that advertising has a negligible if any influence on
underage drinking [57].” The documents related to the
three alcohol companies’ codes of conduct also state that
their voluntary codes are externally monitored and regu-
lated. Our closer investigation, however, shows that there
is limited independent input and a lack of comprehensive
enforcement, leaving important areas under-regulated. For
example, SABMiller’s self-regulated packaging and market-
ing communication materials are assessed by Ebiquity and
KPMG, both of which turn out to be private marketing
and industry consultant companies while those of Pernod
Ricard and AB InBev are monitored by the companies
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This suggests that there is little transparency and almost
no third party control and sanctions behind the veil of the
alcohol companies’ skillfully formulated ethical rules. The
sole reliance on self-regulation and lack of public account-
ability mean that the alcohol industry’s voluntarist narra-
tives are designed to avoid effective alcohol policies.
CSR as brand marketing and promotion: corporate
philanthropy
Corporate philanthropy is another mechanism utilized
by alcohol companies as part of their good corporate
citizenship activities. The alcohol industry’s engagement
in a broad spectrum of philanthropic activities is well de-
scribed in each alcohol corporation’s website mainly
under the theme of sustainable development and hu-
manitarian endeavours.
In reviewing the industry materials, we have found that
corporate philanthropy activities of the alcohol companies
are characterized by two aspects: social outreach and spon-
sorship of the arts and cultural events. Social outreach en-
compasses activities from disaster relief charity work and
sponsorships to underserved communities such as hunger
and poverty charities to environmental sustainability initia-
tives including reduction of water use and carbon emission.
From the viewpoint of the alcohol industry, corporate phil-
anthropy is not just a strategy for brand promotion but is a
tactic to enter, supply and develop local markets. Recent
evidence suggests that global alcohol corporations’ phil-
anthropic activities tend to target emerging economies
with large youth populations [58]. Fast growing markets
for alcohol consumption have become popular destina-
tions for alcohol companies to demonstrate their cor-
porate philanthropy.
A typical example is the One Rupee Fund that Pernod Ri-
card launched for vaccinations and health education in
rural India in 2011 [59]. Similarly, AB InBev claimed to
have donated USD $38,000 to sponsor children of migrant
workers in China in 2010 [60]. Intriguingly, behind their
philanthropic activities, one can see the alcohol companies’
intentions for growth in these emerging markets. In its an-
nual report, Pernod Ricard noted that “Growth was re-
markable in the two key markets of China and India. China
led the way, growing of 14% by volume in the wake of
strong demand for ultra-premium brands… India grew
25% [61].” AB InBev also stated that “Our revenue growth
was driven primarily by higher volume in Brazil, Argentina
and China… Anheuser-Busch InBev has a foot firmly
planted in the Chinese market, the largest potential growth
pool for the beer industry [62].” On the other end of the
spectrum, SABMiller claimed that it pledged USD $34 mil-
lion in 2012 in community projects primarily focusing on
the creation of sustainable economic opportunities for
small entrepreneurs in several developing countries [63].Despite the company’s seemingly altruistic contribution,
one can observe a profit-oriented business motive behind
its efforts in corporate philanthropy. Statements from
Christine Thompson, the policies issues manager of
SABMiller plc, indicate that the alcohol company’s small
entrepreneur initiatives are not simply driven by benevo-
lent intentions but are also an active attempt to increase
corporate domination and opportunity:
The business objectives for engaging with small-scale
farmers have differed from region to region, ranging
from strengthening government relations to securing
future input supplies… In Uganda and Zambia,
smallholder sourcing was central to the launch of a
new brand, Eagle Lager, which was only made possible
due to special excise reductions agreed with
government. In India, the main business driver was to
ensure the quality and security of agricultural supply
needed to meet rapidly growing demand for
SABMiller’s products nationally. In Tanzania, the
business benefits were seen as securing the supply of
quality barley in the face of uncertain commodity
prices and supply, and generating savings of excise tax
through import substitution [64].
The statement above reinforces the criticism that the
philanthropic charity work done by the industry has
underlying economic motives rather than an altruistic
drive towards sustainable development.
Sponsorship of the arts and cultural events is another
form of the CSR activities of the alcohol companies. In
particular, the wine industry appears to have actively en-
gaged in this type of sponsorship given that wine is
claimed to be symbolically associated with culture, art
and sophistication. Sponsorship of the arts usually takes
place either in the form of endowments and scholar-
ships/awards to young artists or funding to highly publi-
cized cultural events. Pernod Ricard, one of the major
players in the global wine market, is seen as an active
patron of the arts. In exercising corporate philanthropy,
brand name attachment to events was found to be a
common corporate tactic. Havana Cultura, an annual
international cultural event sponsored by Pernod Ricard,
illustrates this point [65]. Another industry practice is to
exploit popular cultural events as a vehicle to foster ad-
vertising and marketing of alcoholic products. Such cul-
tural patronage undoubtedly attracts the attention of the
youth population and links alcohol company’s respective
brands to the events.
Pernod Ricard states that its sponsorship of daily con-
certs of the greatest DJs in Thailand held in 2011 was
“given full 360° media support with 13,500 new fans on
Facebook and 13 million hits on search engines [66].” Simi-
larly, the company’s sponsorship of a youth talent
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namely the ABOSULUT initiative, garnered “400,000 visi-
tors” on its website [67]. In a media saturated environment,
alcohol companies are seeking to find more innovative
ways to promote brand marketing, and CSR offers various
effective avenues. Corporate philanthropy is sometimes
designed with the intention of promoting alcohol brands.
There appears to be an increasingly high level of expend-
iture worldwide on sponsorship as an important form of
CSR.Discussion
Our analysis identified three CSR tactics employed by the
alcohol corporations which are closely tied in with the
industry’s underlying corporate intents. First, alcohol man-
ufacturers employ CSR to frame issues, define problems
and guide policy debates. For example, by seizing the initia-
tive to discuss the genesis of alcohol-related problems, the
industry is able to pinpoint whom or what is to be blamed.
The CSR narratives hardly locate any responsibility with
the industry itself [68]. Instead, the alcohol industry pro-
motes an idea that alcohol can cause problems only in the
hands of a small number of users – who are by nature abu-
sive and reckless (consequently negligent) – and therefore
this small group is to be blamed. Arguably, this “personal
responsibility” narrative manifested in the alcohol compan-
ies’ CSR is designed to shield the alcohol industry from
mounting criticism of aggressive marketing practices that
normalize alcohol drinking as part of everyday life. Find-
ings from our study evidently indicate that the alcohol cor-
porations do not support the implementation of any
restrictive measures on the alcohol industry’s behaviour or
policies that aim at the reduction of the overall volume of
alcohol consumption [69,70]. There is also evidence that
educational interventions, heavily reliant on the idea of
“personal responsibility”, do not reduce alcohol consump-
tion or alcohol related-harm [71,72]. The personal respon-
sibility frame put forward by the alcohol industry
emphasises individual failings, effectively shifting the atten-
tion from those who manufacture and promote the prod-
ucts to those who consume them.
Second, the alcohol manufacturers’ CSR initiative pro-
motes voluntary regulation to limit the purview of govern-
mental regulation [73,74]. Underscoring the argument for
self-regulation is the rosy view that members of alcohol in-
dustry are better-suited to monitoring rule-following rather
than through mandatory legal regulation. Our findings indi-
cate however that the industry’s CSR accounts seriously
lack transparency and public accountability because the al-
cohol manufactures’ self-regulatory practices have been
rarely monitored and assessed by independent bodies. This
is in keeping with the existing analyses that industry self-
regulatory codes are ineffective and highly subjective[75-77]. The very fact that the alcohol industry has an ap-
parent aversion to legislative restrictions directly contra-
dicts its claims that the industry as a whole can be a good
corporate citizen. There is a fundamental and irreconcilable
conflict of interest here. The alcohol industry’s claim on
self-regulation has dire policy implications as it usurps the
government’s responsibility to provide the duty of care to
the populace, and devolves the responsibility to the hands
of a few private entities who are accountable only to share-
holders [78].
The alcohol industry’s third mainstream CSR tactic is
philanthropic sponsorship for development issues and cul-
tural events. Contrary to the righteous goal of corporate
philanthropy portrayed by the companies, we have ob-
served that the alcohol corporations undertook philan-
thropic sponsorships for two main reasons. First, it is a
means of indirect brand marketing. Second, it allows the
alcohol industry to gain preferential access to emerging al-
cohol markets. One of our findings reveals that “brand
stretching” (advertising of non-alcohol events carrying al-
cohol brand names) is a prominent feature in the industry’s
supposed benevolent activities [79]. Research suggests that
the impact of corporate philanthropy goes much deeper
than traditional marketing strategy [80]. Since the philan-
thropic sponsorship is conducted under the CSR activities,
it is difficult for local governments and international bodies
to monitor and regulate these activities. As such, the alco-
hol industry’s CSR philanthropy can pose a major challenge
for public health policy. The absence of clear guidelines to
address the adverse effects of corporate philanthropy on
public health gives rise to further difficulties.
In light of the evidence found in our paper, several con-
tradictions in the alcohol industry’s CSR activities are ap-
parent. Should a corporation whose main concern is with
yielding profit (and thus selling more alcoholic beverages)
be permitted to participate in campaigns to regulate the
promotion, sale and consumption of alcohol? Would an
approach in favour of the personal responsibility of individ-
ual drinkers be sufficient to prevent alcohol-related harm
without active enforcement of regulations? How could we
conceive of the alcohol industry’s philanthropic sponsor-
ships in the absence of a clear monitoring of its business
intent? Would a public health strategy aimed at reducing
overall consumption of alcohol be compatible with the
industry’s strategy, which is to promote overall consump-
tion albeit responsibly? [81] Should a company that spon-
sors popular events and targets the youth be allowed to
contribute to programs that are designed to prevent the
very same youth from drinking? The core of these contra-
dictions is that there is a conflict of interest for the alcohol
industry when it comes to mitigating the “negatives” on
which their business relies. The alcohol industry’s CSR ef-
forts as a whole can never eradicate the “negatives” - at
best, the CSR efforts can conceal them but at worst, it
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CSR claims directly contradict any illusion of improved
corporate behaviour.
A recent trend indicates that alcohol industry’s CSR ef-
forts have been extended to working in partnership with
governments in public health policy making. Through a
co-regulation framework, the industry members have in-
creasingly engaged in formulating policy agendas and
undertaking the delivery of policy solutions. The advent of
industry partnerships is well exemplified by the UK Public
Health Responsibility Deal [82] where alcohol corporations
and business organizations are invited to join a partnership
with government to curb alcohol misuse and its associated
social harms. Similar experiences can be found in the
European Alcohol and Health Forum [83], the Implemen-
tation of Partnership Agreement in Scotland [84], and
various alcohol policy initiatives in countries of sub-
Saharan Africa [85]. Involvement of alcohol corporations
as partners in the policy making was claimed to have
yielded certain public health policy steps. For instance, the
legislation of the minimum unit pricing of alcohol in
Scotland is seen as a small step forward. However, there is
little evidence that a concerted action to tackle the increas-
ingly innovative marketing of alcohol products is under
way through such public-private partnership [86,87]. It
remains to be seen if this could be a “one step forward,
two steps backwards” situation.
The public health community has cautioned that the
strategy and influence of these corporations can steer dis-
cussion away from effective alcohol control measures with-
out many realizing it [88]. Indeed, the alcohol corporations
seem to have been successful in framing the nature of
alcohol problems by generating distorted views of evi-
dence, thereby shaping policy responses in particular ways
[89-91]. Research suggests that policy outcomes emerged
from recent evolution of CSR partnerships are consonant
with the view of alcohol industry, an approach that high-
lights “irresponsible drinking” and eschews regulation of
the industry’s corporate practices [92,93]. This means that
the role of industry CSR in public health policy needs to be
subjected to closer scrutiny and that conflict of interest
should be rigorously managed in any partnership working
with alcohol corporations.
The observations on the alcohol industry’s CSR activities
remind us of the political tactics employed by other cor-
porate sectors amidst growing pressures from the public
regarding the societal ills they produced [94,95]. For ex-
ample, the tobacco industry employed political and public
relations strategies to effectively thwart the much needed
changes in countries where robust control measures were
generally absent. That such strategies are appealing for the
alcohol industry is not unforeseen and to a large extent, we
see similarities in the behaviour of actors in the tobacco
and alcohol industries [96]. What is noteworthy is that thealcohol industry is more than ever expanding its CSR strat-
egies to further diminish and inverse its responsibility for
alcohol-related problems across both the developed and
more worryingly the developing world at an alarming rate
with no sign of abatement.
Conclusions
This paper has demonstrated that the alcohol industry em-
ploys CSR as a means to appear as a responsible actor while
shaping and reinforcing the industry’s firmly established po-
sitions on key alcohol policy issues. Policy officials should
remain wary of the true purpose and scope of activities
portrayed as socially responsible by the alcohol industry.
Public health advocates should closely monitor, scrutinize,
and challenge as necessary every altruistic claim that the al-
cohol industry makes [97]. What is also essential is for
scholars and government officials to critically assess the al-
cohol industry’s involvement in government and policy ini-
tiatives that alters what might otherwise have been depicted
as a profit-driven economic entity into a palatable public
health advocate. More fundamentally, the implementation
of any measures on alcohol control should include banning
or restricting the publicity efforts of the industry’s CSR [98].
This may include but not limited to mandatory disclosure
of conflicts of interest in any industry sponsorship or in-
kind contribution, prohibition on CSR advertising that dir-
ectly or indirectly promotes alcohol brands and products,
and compliance inspections and penalties through enforce-
able legal measures.
It is, however, doubtful that mandated action would be in-
troduced at the national level in the absence of supporting
collective efforts and global health governance particularly
given the sheer scale and magnitude of the political influ-
ence of transnational alcohol companies [99-101]. Lessons
are learned in the tobacco arena when an international con-
vention - Framework Convention on Tobacco Control
(FCTC) - has made remarkable global impacts in providing
an impetus to local and national tobacco control initiatives
[102,103]. FCTC recognizes that the tobacco industry em-
ploys CSR to undermine and weaken tobacco control pol-
icies. More specifically, Article 5.3 of the Convention and its
Guidelines demand the commitment of all Parties to protect
public health polices from commercial and other vested in-
terests of the tobacco industry [104,105]. A robust body of
research into industry documents and case studies further
provides an insight into a wide array of measures in re-
sponse the tobacco industry’s CSR tactics that are increas-
ingly more sophisticated and diverse [106-112]. As a result,
the past few years have seen a strengthening of measures
curbing industry CSR activities with countries moving from
weak policies to more comprehensive restrictions [113].
The remarkable achievement and the breadth of inter-
national collaboration in tobacco control through FCTC
provide an encouraging instance of public health being
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a similar governance mechanism could be developed to
support coordinated alcohol control efforts. Our findings
underline the importance of developing an equivalent
international instrument for alcohol control globally. It
is only through such internationally binding measures
that more commitments and resources to advancing al-
cohol control can be achieved.
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